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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY J. UDY, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
REBECCA UDY, 
Defendant, Appellee. 
District Court No. 924000268 
Court of Appeals No. 930791-CA 
Priority Classification: 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff or "Mr. Udy") submits the 
following as his brief of appellant herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60 Motion. The order denying the 
Motion was entered by the Honorable Gordon J. Low of the first district court, box 
elder county, sitting without a jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial Court err in ordering Mr. Udy to pay child support to Mrs. Udy 
by calculating support using a sole custody worksheet, where the parenting schedule 
ordered provides that Mr. Udy care for the parties' minor child more than thirty-three 
percent (33%) of the time? 
Did the trial Court err by not using a joint custody worksheet in calculating 
Mr. Udy's child support obligations? 
Did the trial Court fail to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in ruling on Mr. Udy's Motion requesting that his child support obligations be 
calculated by using a joint custody worksheet? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78, Chapter 45, et. seq. may be determinative 
of the outcome in this appeal. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this appeal as to the issue presented on appeal is a 
reversal of error standard, since the issue presented is one of law. Office of Recovery 
Services v. VGPy 845 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion. The Order (Record On 
Appeal, [hereinafter, R.O.A.] 204]) was entered in the First Judicial District Court 
and for Box Elder County, by the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge 
presiding. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.O.A. 167-177) were signed on 
November 5, 1993, and entered by the trial Court on November 9, 1993. 
An Amended Decree of Divorce was signed on November 23,1993, and entered 
by the trial Court on December 1, 1993. The Amended Decree was entered by 
agreement of the parties to correct the simple clerical error of a line having been 
inadvertently omitted in the original Decree at the top of page seven (7). A copy of 
the Amended Decree is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "A". 
A Motion to Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet made pursuant 
to Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah rules of civil Procedure was dated October 1, 1993, 
and entered by the trial court on the same date. (R.O.A. 126-136) 
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The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying plaintiff's Motion to 
Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet, which Memorandum Decision was 
dated November 23, 1993 and entered by the Court on November 24, 1993. (R.O.A. 
192-193) 
The Order denying plaintiffs Rule 59 and 60 Motion was signed on december 
8, 1993, and entered by the trial Court on December 10, 1993. (R.O.A. 204) A copy 
of said Order is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "B". 
The aforesaid Motion has no effect on the pendency of this appeal, and is in 
fact part of this appeal. There is no motion pending pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 
52(b), 54(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Udy were married on July 27,1987 in the City of Fielding, State 
of Utah. (R.O.A. 1) One child was born as issue of their marriage, to wit: Joshua 
Jay Udy, born August 1, 1990. (R.O.A. 2) 
Following the birth of Joshua, Mr. and Mrs. Udy both worked full time, albeit 
during different shifts. Mrs. Udy worked a day shift from 6:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. 
and Mr. Udy worked a swing shift from 4:00 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. "This arrangement 
allowed one parent to be with the child" nearly all the time "and did not require day 
care for any extended time." (R.O.A. 2) 
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The parties' separation to different residences came about by Mrs. Udy leaving 
the marital abode and establishing her own independent residence. At the time of 
the parties' separation, they agreed that custody of Joshua would be shared. 
Specifically, they agreed that each of them would care for Joshua while the other was 
working, and that they would share visitation with Joshua by each of them caring for 
him every alternating weekend. (R.O.A. 2-3) Mr. Udy assumed all the historic 
family living expenses, including those for Joshua, other than those incurred 
separately by Mrs. Udy for herself and the child while in her care. 
Mr. Udy filed for divorce on September 21, 1992 requesting that the parties' 
historical parenting/caretaking schedule of Joshua continue. (R.O.A. 4) The same 
day, the Court issued an ex-parte order providing temporary joint custody continuing 
the historical schedule pending a hearing. (R.O.A. 11-12) 
A hearing was held on October 8, 1992 before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner Michael Allphin. Custody of Joshua is described in the Order resulting 
from the hearing as being awarded to Mrs. Udy. (R.O.A. 27) Nevertheless, the Court 
provided that Joshua would continue to spend time and be cared for by Mr. and Mrs. 
Udy under a shared parenting schedule, which schedule was virtually identical to 
that followed by the parties prior to the divorce being initiated. (R.O.A. 28-29, 31) 
The schedule provided that Joshua would be cared for by Mr. Udy about one-third of 
overnights and roughly forty-five percent (45%) of the overall parenting/caretaking 
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time considering days and overnights. The Court found little historical third-party 
child care and "that the child would [continue to] be better off with a natural parent 
than with day care providers.1' The aforesaid Order further provided: 
3. The Court will deviate from the child support called for under a 
sole custody schedule because the father will have the child for 
substantial periods of time. Accordingly, the plaintiff shall pay child 
support to the defendant in the amount of $150.00 per month which will 
commence with the month of October, 1992. (Emphasis added) 
4. Each party shall pay one-half of any day care costs reasonably 
incurred for the minor child during the time the parents are working 
[and neither parent is available]. (R.O.A. 29) 
If the Court had calculated Mr. Udy's child support obligations using a sole 
custody worksheet, he would have been ordered to pay in the neighborhood of $275.11 
per month. (R.O.A. 8-9) The Court ordered Mr. Udv to pay only $150.00 per month 
because of the percentage of time ordered under the parenting/residential schedule 
for Joshua to be cared for by Mr. Udv. 
The Court also directed that if the parties continued to disagree upon a final 
resolution of the custody/parenting schedule issue, that the parties were to attempt 
to agree upon a person to perform a custody evaluation. (R.O.A. 29) 
From October, 1992 through the first part of January, 1993, the parties 
continued working different shifts and Joshua spent nearly equal time being care for 
by each parent. (R.O.A. 46) Towards the end of 1992, Mr. Tidy's employer offered 
him an opportunity to work the day shift, which shift he had desired to work for 
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approximately five (5) years. (R.O.A. 248) Mr. Udy commenced working day shift 
during the first part of January, 1993. (R.O.A. 47) Notwithstanding Mr. tidy's shift 
change, he urged the court to maintain the parenting/residential schedule and 
caretaking time percentages for Joshua (R.O.A. 47), though the historical schedule 
would have needed some modification. 
Subsequent to the aforesaid October 8, 1992, hearing, the parties experienced 
difficulties in agreeing to a particular person to perform the evaluation concerning 
the best custody and parenting schedule arrangements for Joshua. (R.O.A. 47-51,55-
57, 71-72) 
A hearing held before Commissioner Allphin on February 11, 1993, produced 
a Recommendation and Order providing: 
a) The evaluation of Joshua's best interests would be performed by 
both Dr. Brent Price and Dr. Derek Mason to "cooperate and work jointly, if possible," 
with Mr. and Mrs. Udy paying each of them respectively. (R.O.A. 81-82) 
b) Mrs. tidy's interests in the parenting and caretaking of Joshua 
were continued to be labeled "sole custody". Mr. Udy's parenting/caretaking interests 
described as "visitation" were rescheduled to a rather standard arrangement. This 
rescheduling caused a reduction in the overnights with Joshua to less than twenty-
five percent (25%) and the total parenting/caretaking time including days and 
overnights, to roughly thirty percent (30%). (R.O.A. 82-83) 
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c) Mr. Udy's child support obligations were increased to $275.00 per 
month in addition to any day care expenses for Joshua. (R.O.A. 83) 
On or about April 21, 1993, Dr. Derek T. Mason submitted his custody 
evaluation with conclusions and recommendations. Dr. Mason concluded that Mr. 
Udy's "determination to continue to play and important part in his son's life is 
impressive". (Mason's evaluation, at 7) In Dr. Mason's recommendations, he found 
that, "Brad is a loving, caring parent and I think it critical that he have more time 
with his son. Therefore I would urge the court to allow expanded visitation between 
Joshua and Brad, something that will certainly be to Joshua's benefit." (Mason's 
evaluation, at 7) 
On or bout April 30,1993, Dr. T. Brent Price submitted his custody evaluation 
with recommendations. In his evaluation, Dr. Price noted pursuant to RJA Rule 4-
903, the following under section "C" entitled, The relative strength of the child's bond 
with one or both of the prospective custodians: "[Joshua] has spent most of his time 
with both of his parents. He is attached to his father and mother as evidenced by the 
observation and interaction with both parents and with Joshua." Dr. Price further 
noted under section "D": "Joshua seems to be doing rather well by dividing his time 
between his parents. He needs both of this parents at this stage of his life. Brad 
would like more time with his son." 
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The parenting/residential schedule originally implemented by the Order dated 
October 8, 1992 (R.O.A. 27), with Joshua spending about thirty-three percent (33%) 
of overnights with Mr. Udy, had been scaled back to less than twenty-five percent 
(25%) under the Order of February 11, 1993 (R.O.A. 82-83). Dr. Price's 
recommendations stressed that "Brad should have increased visitation", and 
suggested an every-other-day arrangement. (Dr. Price's evaluation, under 
Recommendations) While recommending this substantial increase, he further 
recommended that "The court should caution Becky about the importance of allowing 
Brad to have regular scheduled visitation." (Dr. Price's evaluation, under 
Recommendations) 
On or about May 7, 1993 a Settlement Conference was held before the 
Honorable Gordon J. Low. Both parties were ordered to submit a "Status Report" on 
the contested issues of the case within thirty (30) days. (R.O.A. 94) 
Mrs. Udv's Status Report On or about May 20,1993, Mrs. Udy submitted her 
Status Report. (R.O.A. 97-101) Under the Visitation section therein, she states she 
"is willing to allow expanded visitation" (R.O.A. 97) and thereafter sets forth a 
schedule (R.O.A. 97-98) providing but few overnights beyond the "Minimum Schedule 
for Visitation" provided in Utah Code §30-3-35 enacted by the Utah Legislature in 
1993. She then "Note[s that] 78-45-2(7) defines joint physical custody when the child 
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stays with the parent overnight more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the year (.25 
x 365 = 91.25 nights)." (R.O.A. 98) 
Under the Child Support section of her Report she states, "The Uniform Child 
Support Worksheet [for less than 25% overnights with Mr. Udy] shows Bradley would 
pay $268.00 per month in child support. Rebecca's share is $166.00. Bradley is now 
paying $275.00 per month in child support." (R.O.A. 98) Further, that "Bradley Udv 
may say he is entitled to calculate support based on a Joint Custody Worksheet if he 
has Joshua more than 91.25 nights a year. If so, Rebecca Udy will likewise follow the 
law on that matter " (Emphasis added) (R.O.A. 99) 
Mr. Udy*s Status Report On or about June 2, 1993, Mr. Udy submitted his 
Status Report to the Court. He notes under the section dealing with CUSTODY: 
"Each [custody evaluator] recommends expanded visitation more than 
normally provided almost to the extent of joint custody. Thus far, the 
parties are unable to agree as to what 'expanded visitation' means. 
Brad Udy would essentially like the child approximately one-half of the 
time and agrees that his wife should have the child approximately one-
half of the time. During the initial period after the divorce was filed the 
child essentially spent half the time with Brad and half the time with 
Becky. This occurred from the months of October, 1992 through 
January, 1993. In January, 1993 both parties began working the same 
shift, and the time Brad had the child diminished. 
(R.O.A. 104-105) Under his VISITATION section, after reiterating the reduced 
schedule then in place, Mr. Udy states : 
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Becky has refused any more visitation. 
Brad is suggesting an every other week visitation with a mid-
week visitation for the parent with the off week. This would limit it to 
three day maximum away from either parent at one time, allowing Josh 
to be raised by both parents. (R.O.A. 106) 
Then in his CHILD SUPPORT section he states: 
Brad Udy is willing to pay child support based upon his 1992 and 
her 1992 W-2 statements. The court needs to determine whether this 
is, in fact, a joint custody arrangement as opposed to a sole custody 
arrangement, to compute child support accurately. (Emphasis added) 
(R.O.A. 106) 
A one day trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on September 1, 
1993. Mr. Udy testified that Joshua's best interest would be served by a joint custody 
arrangement and that a mediation process could resolve any differences between the 
parties (R.O.A. 247), but that they had no particular philosophical diflFerences in 
raising Joshua. (R.O.A. 248) 
Both parties testified that during the summer of 1993 — a period subsequent 
to Drs. Mason and Price completing their evaluations ~ that the parenting/residential 
schedule was basically equal. (R.O.A. 249 and Defendant's Exhibit #1) Mrs. Udy 
testified that during the aforesaid summer Brad had spent "about 46 percent of the 
time with Josh", that such a parenting/residential schedule should continue. (R.O.A. 
303) She also testified that Joshua would adjust well to any new schedule ordered 
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by the court, including after he commences school, so long as the parties Hve in the 
same school area. (R.O.A. 303-304) 
Mr. Udy testified that Joshua's interests would be best served by a 
parenting/residential schedule alternating weekly (R.O.A. 249-250), but if the Court 
was not agreeable to such, that extended "weekends begin perhaps on Wednesday and 
run through Sunday night" would provide Joshua the most stable set schedule. 
(R.O.A. 251) 
Under cross-examination by Mrs. Udy's counsel, Mr. Udy distinguished 
between quality verses the quantity of time with Joshua: 
Q. Is it true that you feel that the quantity of time with the 
child, 50/50 time with each parent, is very important? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You feel that the amount of time, 50/50 time, is more 
important than the quality or the kind of time you spend with this boy, 
isn't that correct? 
A. Of course not. Quality time is much better. 
Q. And if you were to receive a block of time that was just 
quality time, would that be more important to you or would you prefer 
to have 50/50 time? 
A. Quality time is great, yes, but I see no reason why there should 
not be the 50/50 time. That is how he's been raised his entire life. I 
believe it would be altering that to go otherwise now. 
(R.O.A. 278-279) 
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On examination from her own counsel, Mrs. Udy testified that she had no 
trouble with a schedule providing that Joshua be cared for by Mr. Udy from 
Wednesday through Sunday evening on alternating weeks, so long as she could spend 
a couple hours with Joshua after work before Mr. Udy picked him up. 
Under cross-examination, Mrs. Udy testified that Joshua adjusted well to the 
relatively equal parenting schedule experienced during the summer of 1993 and that 
Joshua did well during that summer (R.O.A. 315). Further, that Joshua was stable 
at both parent's homes while sharing equal parenting time for more than a week at 
a time with each parent, stating, "He does good with it". (R.O.A. 317) 
Mr. Udy also testified that a significant portion of his monthly budget is used 
to provide directly for Joshua or which are attributable to him, over and above the 
child support he pays to Mrs. Udy, including the following: Additional utility 
expenses, life insurance, a portion of the house payment, daycare, food, clothing, book 
club, and savings for college. (R.O.A. 235-236 and Plaintiffs trial Exhibit #2) A copy 
of said trial Exhibit is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "C". 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court granted "sole custody to the defendant" 
(R.O.A. 144), then went on "to expand that sole custody somewhat over the legislative 
gxiidelines and schedule." (R.O.A. 145) The Amended Decree of Divorce provides in 
part, as follows: 
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3. VISITATION 
The court will adopt the legislative guidelines for visitation as 
promulgated under UTAH CODE ANN §30-3-35, and in addition will 
give the following expanded visitation: 
(a) On the weekend in which the father will have the 
child, he may pick the child up Wednesday evening at 6:30 p.m. 
and may keep the child Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and shall 
return the child Sunday at 7:00 p.m. to the mother's home. 
(b) On the week when the father does not have the child 
for his weekend, he shall be entitled to have the child Wednesday 
evening from 3:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
(R.O.A. 195; See also transcript of ruling, R.O.A. at 145-146) Notwithstanding that 
the aforesaid schedule provides that Joshua be cared for by Mr. Udy on thirty-three 
percent (33%) of the overnights throughout each year (R.O.A. 136), the Court orally 
stated in its decision: "The child support will be pursuant to the sole custody 
schedule and pursuant to Defendant's Exhibit No. 5." (R.O.A. 149) Based thereon, 
the Amended Decree of Divorce provides in part, as follows: 
4. CHILD SUPPORT 
The court shall calculate child support based upon a sole custody 
worksheet. For purposes of computing the child support worksheet, the 
father will have gross income of $2,786.00 per month and the mother 
will have gross income of $1,720.00 per month; the father will receive a 
credit of $22.00 per month for medical insurance which he provides, 
which leaves the plaintiff to pay the sum of $273.00 per month as and 
for child support for the minor child. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Child Support Guidelines define "joint physical custody" at Utah Code 
Section 78-45-2(7) as "the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% 
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to 
paying child support." Under the schedule ordered by the trial court during which 
each parent is responsible for caring for Joshua, Mr. Udy has the child during 46% 
of the total time and 33% of the overnights. Mr. Udy also directly contributes more 
than Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month for Joshua's financial benefit in 
addition to paying child support to Mrs. Udy. Given the aforesaid schedule and 
financial contribution, the Guidelines presume that Joshua's best interest is served 
by calculating child support using a "joint-custody worksheet". 
A computation of Mr. Udy's child support using a joint custody worksheet, 
results in an obligation as low as $53.00 per month and in no case higher than 
$112.00 per month. The aforesaid difference depends on whether the 46% total time 
or just the 33% of the overnights is considered in the calculation. In either case, the 
trial court erred in ordering the parties to calculate child support using a 
"sole-custody worksheet", resulting in Mr. Udy having a $273.00 per month support 
obligation. 
The trial court deviated from the child support guidelines in ordering the 
parties to compute child support by using a "sole-custody worksheet". The trial Court 
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made no findings which support a deviation from said guidelines nor any findings 
which rebut the presumption of the guidelines being applicable to this matter. 
Mr. Udy properly brought a timely Motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to correct the trial Court's legal, non-clerical mistake. The 
trial Court erred in denying said Motion. 
This Court should reverse the trial Court's Order that child support be 
calculated by using a "sole-custody worksheet" and direct the trial Court to compute 
child support using a "joint-custody worksheet. In the alternative, this Court should 
remand directing the trial Court to enter findings which may support a deviation 
from the child support guidelines and which could rebut the presximption of said 
guidelines being appropriate for this case. 
ARGUMENT: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING CHILD 
SUPPORT USING A SOLE-CUSTODY WORKSHEET RATHER 
THAN A JOINT-CUSTODY WORKSHEET. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE CHILD 
SUPPORT GUIDELINES' DEFINITION OF "JOINT PHYSICAL 
CUSTODY" WHEN CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT UNDER 
THE PARENTING/RESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE ORDERED. 
In awarding custody of the parties' minor child, Joshua Udy, the Court granted 
"sole custody to the defendant" (R.O.A. 144), then went on "to expand that sole 
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custody somewhat over the legislative guidelines and schedule." (R.O.A. 145) 
Concerning the custody of Joshua, the Amended Decree of Divorce provides, "The 
care, custody and control of the minor child, JOSHUA J. UDY, born August 1, 1990, 
shall be awarded to the defendant." (R.O.A. 195, Amended Decree, Page 2, Paragraph 
2) The Court did not differentiate in its award, between legal and physical custody. 
Mrs. Udy's custody of Joshua was expanded to include Mr. Udy having the care and 
control over Joshua while in his custody under the extensive "visitation" schedule 
ordered by the Court. 
Throughout this brief, the schedule under which the trial court ordered that 
Joshua be under the care of each respective parent is referred to as the 
"parenting/residential schedule" for the child. Both the words, "custody" and 
"visitation" are derived historically from a criminal law context in which a person is 
taken into custody by law enforcement personnel and allowed visitation by family and 
friends. Such terms have been employed in a family law context as a matter of 
convenience in legal expression. Nevertheless, their use in a family law context 
actually demeans the child to a status perhaps below even that of mere property, and 
likens the child's parental caretaking responsibilities to that of a warden over a 
prisoner. (See The Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Differentiation Between 
Fabricated and Genuine Child Sex Abuse, Richard A. Gardner, M.D., Creative 
Therapeutics, 1988, Chapter Two, "Brief Review of Western Society's Changing 
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Attitudes Regarding Parental Preference in Custody Disputes".) 
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah App. 1991), the Court 
indicated that the "custody" and "visitation" labels are not as important as the 
description given those terms by the Court in defining their meaning in a given case 
context.1 
The label ascribed by the trial court to the time schedule under which Joshua 
is to spend with each of his parents in the instant case is not as important as the 
1
 The Court noted the following at footnote #1 in Thronson: 
Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges and 
writers have been loose with their "joint" custody language. 
Early articles identified this vexing problem as follows: 
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split, joint] 
following divorce and the terms which describe them are 
vague and overlapping. The lack of standard definitions 
and the courts' tendency to use certain terms 
interchangeably have created confusion. 
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 
12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525 (1979). 
Often, when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements, courts use vague language or inadequately 
defined terms. 
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky.L.J. 271, 283 1978-79). 
One author points out that considerable semantic 
confusion has resulted possibly because the "term" joint 
custody predates the "concept" of joint custody as it is known 
today. He states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms 
used to refer to various alternatives to sole custody: joint 
legal custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, 
separate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing 
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody, 
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given to neither 
party to the exclusion of the other,' temporary custody, 
shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Joint 
Custody, 13(3) Fam.L.Q. 245, 360 n. 79 (1979) 
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meaning intended by the court in employing the terms. In this matter, the trial 
Court denoted as "visitation" the time during which Joshua would, in essence, be 
under the actual care, physical custody and control, of Mr. Udy, and denoted as "sole 
custody" all the other times in which he would be under the same of Mrs. Udy. In 
using the labels "custody" and "visitation", the trial Court appropriately established 
a schedule during which the parenting, caretaking, control, and other related 
responsibilities of Joshua's upbringing, for each parent would be ascribed. The trial 
Court thereby defined a "parenting/residential schedule" as referred to herein. 
The Uniform Civil Liability For Support Act, Utah Code Section 78-45-1 et. seq. 
is commonly referred to as the child support "Guidelines" as defined at §78-45-2(6) 
therein. Said Guidelines specify the criteria which differentiate between calculating 
support based on differing parenting/residential schedules. The criteria of cases (§78-
45-7.9) labeled "joint physical custody" differs from cases (§78-45-7.7) other than 
"joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2," in only one 
aspect. (Emphasis added) That aspect, set forth in §78-45-7.9(3) is the consideration 
of "the percentage of time the children spend with the other parent" as a factor. In 
cases other than "joint physical and split custody (§78-45-7.7) the percentage of time 
the children spend with each parent is not a factor. A copy of the aforesaid Sections 
is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "D". 
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The Guidelines provide at §78-45-2(7) that insofar as calculating child support 
is concerned, the definition of"'Joint physical custody' means the child stays with 
each parent overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support." 
Such definition requires two criteria to be met: First, that of the total 
percentage of time, that at least 25% of the child's overnights be spent with each 
parent, and second, that expenses on behalf of the child be contributed by the parents 
over and above their support obligations. 
Fulfillment of the first criteria: Regardless of the "sole-custody" label used by 
the trial court, it "expand[ed] that sole custody somewhat over the legislative 
guidelines and schedule" (R.O.A. 145). The parenting/residential schedule ordered 
by the trial court provides that Mr. Udy care for Joshua 33% of the overnights and 
46% of the total percentage of time. Obviously the foregoing percentages surpass the 
threshold requirement of "overnight[s] for more than 25% of the year". 
The time periods during which Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua, 
labeled as "visitation" in the Amended Decree, and the calculations of child support 
using two different joint custody worksheets, were set forth in an attachment (R.O.A. 
128, 132, and 136) to Mr. Udy^s Rule 60 Motion to Base Child Support on Joint 
Custody Worksheet (R.O.A. 126-7). Said attachment is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"E". 
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The first worksheet (R.O.A. 128), incorporates only the overnight "percentage 
of time each parent has the children". Line 2 of said Worksheet indicates Mrs. and 
Mr. Udy have Joshua overnight on 245 and 120 occasions respectively. Line 3 of said 
Worksheet correctly calculates the percentage of overnights as being 67.12% and 
32.88% respectively. Said Worksheet calculates Mr. Udy's support obligation to Mrs. 
Udy to be $116.00 per month. 
The second worksheet (R.O.A. 132-3), calculates Mr. Udy*s support obligation 
considering the days, as well as the overnights, during which Joshua is in Mr. Udy*s 
care. Line 2 of said Worksheet correctly shows a total of 168 days and overnights 
with Mr. Udy equating to 46.03% of said time as reflected on Line 3 therein. Said 
Worksheet calculates Mr. Udy's support obligation to Mrs. Udy to be only $53.00 per 
month. 
Fulfillment of the second criteria: In establishing the second criteria, the Utah 
Legislature recognized the likelihood, though not inevitable certainty, of parents 
directly contributing more to their children's financial support than shown by their 
obligations in the worksheet calculation. 
Mr. Udy did demonstrate to the trial court that he had historically contributed 
since the parties' separation, and continued to contribute significant sums, to 
Joshua's expenses in addition to paying child support to Mrs. Udy. 
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Early on during the trial, Mr. Udy introduced into evidence his monthly Budget 
as Plaintiffs trial Exhibit #2, which was received by the Court. A copy of said 
Exhibit is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". As shown thereon, the following sums are 
attributable to expenses Mr. Udy is incurring and satisfying for Joshua's direct 
benefit, in addition to support he pays to Mrs. Udy: 
EXPENSE 
Mountain Fuel 
Utah Power & Light 
Tremonton City 
Insight Cable 
GTE Telephone 
Life Insurance 
House Payment 
JOSHUA'S 
TOTAL 
4 4 . 9 5 
1 7 . 7 8 
3 0 . 8 2 
3 8 . 2 5 
2 8 . 4 9 
3 0 . 0 0 
4 6 1 . 5 0 
PORTION 
1 1 . 24 2 
4 . 4 5 3 
7 . 7 1 " 
0 
0 
3 0 . 0 0 5 
1 5 3 . 8 3 6 
2
 This amount is derived by calculating Joshua's portion as 
being only 25% of the total monthly amount incurred. Such 25% is 
a conservative allocation of the additional expense being 
contributed by Mr. Udy for Joshua above that which he would incur 
without Joshua under the ordered parenting/residential schedule. 
3
 Same as footnote 2. 
4
 Same as footnote 2. 
5
 Joshua is designated as the beneficiary of Mr. Udy's Life 
insurance policy. 
6
 This amount is derived by calculating Joshua's portion as 
being only 33% of the total monthly amount incurred. Such 33% is 
a conservative allocation of the additional expense being 
contributed by Mr. Udy for Joshua over that which he would incur 
without Joshua under the parenting/residential schedule. Mrs. Udy 
expends only $200.00 per month for housing for her and Joshua. 
(See Mrs. Udy's [Defendant's] trial Exhibit No. 3) Mr. Udy 
continues to meet the housing expense of the marital residence to 
provide stability and constancy for Joshua. 
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Kidland Daycare 
Child Support 
Food for Josh and Brad 
Clothes - Brad 
Clothes - Josh 
Josh's Book club 
Automotive Expenses 
Gift Fund 
Misc. Spending Money 
Emergency Fund-Savings 
Doctor/Dentist/Medication 
TOTAL: 
118.44 
275.00 
148.01 
33.33 
20.83 
13.00 
113.88 
79.17 
173.33 
216.67 
43.82 
$1,887.37 
37, 
20. 
13, 
25, 
25, 
10. 
$328, 
07 
0 
.008 
0 
.83 
.00 
0 
.00q 
0 
.OO10 
.J6}1 
.06 
As can be seen by the above, Mr. Udy expends and financially contributes 
$328.06 per month directly for Joshua's benefit in addition to paying child support, 
including day care as part of such support. Such a sum certainly meets the requisites 
of the second legislative criteria. Even if this Court were to take a more conservative 
view in the allocation of Joshua's portion of Mr. Udy's expenses, or eliminate entirely 
some of the expense categories attributed to Joshua, Mr. Udy would still demonstrate 
7
 This expense ca tegory i s not inc luded in J o s h u a ' s 
p o r t i o n , i t be ing cons ide red p a r t of c h i l d suppo r t . 
8
 Same as foo tno te 2 . 
9
 The second page of Mr. Udy's Budget a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as 
Exh ib i t "D", shows J o s h u a ' s annual p o r t i o n being $300.00, which sum 
equa l s t o $25.00 per month. 
10
 $25.00 of t h e $216.67 monthly t o t a l can c o n s e r v a t i v e l y be 
a t t r i b u t e d t o J o s h u a ' s c o l l e g e fund as shown on t h e second page of 
Mr. Udy's Monthly budget , a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as Exh ib i t "D". 
11
 Same as foo tno te 2 . 
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a significant financial "contribution] to the expenses of [Joshua] in addition to paying 
child support". 
Mr. Udy demonstrated to the trial court more than sufficient evidence to show 
having fulfilled the two criteria necessary to apply the definition in §78-45-2(7) of 
"joint physical custody" for the purposes of calculating child support. The trial court 
erred in refusing to apply the child support Guidelines by ordering the parties to use 
a "sole-custody" worksheet for calculating support. 
The label of sole custody of Joshua to Mrs. Udy by the trial Court is not as 
important as the meaning intended by the Court when considering the 
parenting/residential schedule it ordered. Suppose a law clerk were offered an job 
position for which the clerk was paid hourly, and the employer labeled the job as a 
"full-time" position, yet it was clearly understood between the employer and the law 
clerk that the clerk's working time would average thirty (30) hours per week. The 
clerk certainly wouldn't expect to be paid for forty (40) hours per week merely 
because the employer labeled the job as a "full-time position. Likewise, a juice 
manufacturer who combines cranberry and apple juice in a single drink may wish to 
label the juice as apple juice. Nevertheless, the juice would still be "cran-apple" to 
the taste. 
Joshua's parenting/residential schedule, labeled "custody" and "visitation" by 
the trial court, clearly provides a 46/54% division of the total time and a 33/67% of 
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the overnights between the parties. The percentage of time Joshua spends with each 
parent is the paramount factor in determining which method is used in calculating 
child support, not the labels relating to the parenting/residential schedule. 
Joshua will be four years old on August 1, 1994. During the remaining period 
of Joshua's minority - the period during which Mr. Udy will have child support 
obligations to Mrs. Udy --, Mr. Udy will expend approximately Fifty-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($55,000.00) contributing directly for Joshua's financial benefit based on 
$328.06 per month. Of course, this sum does not account for any increase in cost of 
living expenses for Joshua over the next fourteen (14) years. A substantial increase 
is inevitable over such a time period. 
Calculating Mr. Udy's child support obligation Under a joint custody worksheet 
arrives at a monthly obligation of either $53.00 or $116.00, depending on whether the 
total 46% of the time, or just the 33% of the overnights are used, as is further 
discussed immediately below. Under the trial court's child support order of $273.00 
per month, Mr. Udy would be required to pay approximately $45,000.00 as child 
support to Mrs. Udy during Joshua's minority, not considering any support increases 
which may occur during such time. 
It would be patently unjust to require Mr. Udy to pay Mrs. Udy $45,000.00 
during Joshua's minority, while directly contributing $55,000.00 at present day dollar 
value to Joshua's financial benefit, the majority of such $55,000.00 being incurred 
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because of the parenting/residential schedule found by the trial court to be in 
Joshua's best interest. 
Mr. Udy's direct contribution to Joshua's financial benefit under the 
parenting/residential schedule inevitably reduces by a significant sum, the expenses 
Mrs. Udy would otherwise incur were she required to care and provide for Joshua 
under a sole-custody schedule where Joshua only spent every-other weekend and 
occasional other times. 
In Mrs. Udy's "Status Report" filed with the trial Court on or about May 20, 
1993, she states: "Bradley Udy may say he is entitled to calculate support based on 
a joint Custody Worksheet if he has Joshua more than 91.25 nights a year. If so, 
Rebecca Udy will likewise follow the law on that matter...." (Emphasis added) Mr. 
Udy has the responsibility of caring for Joshua a total of 120 overnights during each 
year. The child support order should follow the law on that matter. 
Utah's definition of "joint physical custody" for the purposes of calculating child 
support "means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the 
year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support". (§78-45-2(7). Use of Utah's "Minimum schedule for visitation" enacted 
as §30-3-35 in 1993, results in roughly 18% of the overnights being spent with the 
"non-custodial parent". 
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Utah's use of a threshold requirement of at least 25% of the overnights for 
"joint physical custody" calculation purposes, is similar to most states throughout the 
country when computing support in such cases. A publication dated mid-June, 1991, 
by The Joint Custody Association, a national child advocacy organization based in Los 
Angeles and formed at least fifteen years ago, points out the commonality that Utah's 
"joint physical custody" calculation has with most other states. A copy of the relevant 
portion of said publication is attached hereto as Exhibit "F". 
The publication lists a total of thirty-eight states and quotes from their child 
support statutes. Each of those states provide that support be calculated differently 
when the child spends significantly more time with one parent than calculated under 
a standard-type - every-other weekend and holidays, and part of the summer -
schedule. Many of those states' child support guidelines recognize that under a 
schedule such as in this case, significantly lower support is appropriate because the 
"non-custodial parent" is incurring a larger direct contribution to the child's financial 
support and the "custodial parent" is expending less because of such contribution. 
As recent as December, 1993, the Child Support Advisory Committee for 
California recommended further use of different worksheets or tables for computing 
child support obligations where the visitation schedule exceeds 25% of the childs time 
with one parent. See Review of Statewide Child Support Guideline, Section 5.3-5.5 
and 9.9 attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "G". 
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The Order denying Mr. Udy's Rule 60 Motion attached hereto as Exhibit "B 
provides in part as follows: "Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce 
based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in Defendant's response." 
A copy of Mrs. Udy's response (R.O.A. 137-140) is attached hereto and incorporated 
as Exhibit "H". 
In her response Mrs Udy claims in Paragraph 1 that no subsection of Rule 60 can 
justify Mr. Udy's Motion. As explained below in Section III, Mr. Udy's motion that 
support be calculated using a "joint custody worksheet" is valid under either clause 
(Dor (7) of Rule 60. 
In Paragraphs 2 and 3 of her response, Mrs. Udy argues that the trial court 
consistently order child support based on the "sole custody" temporary award of 
October 8, 1992 and in the divorce on September 1, 1993. As noted above, 
Commissioner Alphin who issued the October 8, 1992 Order specifically did not 
calculate support using a sole custody worksheet because of Joshua being in Mr. 
Udy's care for approximately 33% of the overnights and 46% of the total time. 
Mr. Udy's Rule 60 motion was procedurally proper to bring attention to the court 
the necessity and propriety of correcting a legal substantive judicial error. Mr. Udy 
properly brought his motion, as is discussed further below in Section III, to 
appropriately avoid the necessity of pursuing an appeal. 
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Mrs. Udy contends in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of her response that Mr. Udy failed to 
meet the second criteria of S78-45-2C7), that he did not 
show that he paid any sum for Joshua's financial benefit beyond merely paying 
support to Mrs. Udy. As is discussed above, Mr. Udy demonstrated to the trial court 
that he does so in fact expend a significant sum for Joshua's financial benefit in 
addition to paying support to Mrs. Udy. Mrs. Udy is obviously not paying for all the 
"basic needs for the child", nor does Mr. Udy merely spend "for the child's needs just 
like every other father who has visitation" as Mrs. Udy attempts to argue in her 
response. 
Mrs. Udy acknowledges in Paragraph 7 of her response the propriety 
of Mr. Udy bringing his Rule 60 Motion for "error at law" and that propriety is 
further discussed in Section III below. Yet Mrs. Udy further contends in the same 
Paragraph that the trial court took all the factors enumerated in S78-45-7(3) into 
consideration to rebut the guidelines. Nowhere did the trial court set out specific 
findings on the factors as required by S78-45-7(3), which lack of findings is further 
discussed in Section II below. 
Mrs. Udy last argues in Paragraph 8 of her response that Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) 
Motion is improper under Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966). Said case 
dealt specifically with a Rule 59 Motion for new trial, not one brought under Rule 60 
for correction of mistake of law and noted: 
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[W]e also recognize that there by be situations when an order 
denying or granting a new trial may have been made by inadvertence 
or mistake, or when there was some irregularity in connection with the 
obtaining or the granting of the order, in which instance the court could 
of course act to correct any such mistake or irregularity. 
(Drury, at 664.) 
Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) Motion sought to address and correct just such a mistake 
or irregularity as is further supported in his argument contained in Section III below. 
The instant matter is a case of first impression in Utah. It is important that 
in issuing its decision, the Court provide clear guidance as to applying the law to the 
facts of this case. 
Subsection (3) of §78-45-7.9 Joint physical custody - Obligation calculations^ 
implies that the total "percentage of time the children spend with the other parent", 
not just the minimum requisite of 25% of the overnights in §78-45-2(7), be used when 
calculating support. This Court should reverse the trial court's calculation of Mr. 
Udy's $273.00 per month support obligation and remand to the trial Court directing 
it to include the 46% total "percentage of time" and set Mr. Udy's base support 
obligation to Mrs. Udy at $53.00 per month. In the alternative, this Court should 
reverse and remand to include the 33% of overnights and set Mr. Udy's base support 
obligation to Mrs. Udy at $116.00 per month. Both of the aforesaid sums are arrived 
as under the calculations shown in Exhibit "E" herein. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT 
UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO THE 
AMOUNT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD. SPECIFICALLY, THE 
FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A DEVIATION FROM, 
AND TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF, THE GUIDELINES BEING 
IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD, 
Utah Code Section 78-45-7.2(2)&(3) provides as follows: 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts 
resulting from the application of the guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the 
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering 
an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, 
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case 
is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. 
In the instant case, the trial court ordered a parenting/residential schedule 
which provides that Mr. Udy care for Joshua 46% of the total time and 33% of the 
overnights. Such a schedule, along with Mr. Udy's direct contribution of $328.06 per 
month to Joshua's expenses, is in conformance with the definition of "joint physical 
custody" pursuant to S78-45-2(7). For the purposes of calculating Mr. Udy*s child 
support obligation, a joint custody worksheet should have been employed. 
In Hill u. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724-725 (Utah App. 1992) the Court noted that, 
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[F]ailure of the trial court to consider and make findings on 
statutorily mandated factors is itself an abuse of discretion. See, 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah App. 1988). 
* * * 
In order to rebut this satutory presumption, the trial court must 
make a finding that use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate 
or not in the best interest of the child Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-7.2(3) 
(1992).* * * The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to 
apply the presumptive guidelines and determined child support outside 
the guidelines without finding there were specidal circumstances that 
justified deviation. See, Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.21d 909,911 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The trial court's order that the parties use a sole custody worksheet for 
calculating child support is a deviation from the guidelines. The trial court made no 
finding supporting a deviation from the guidelines. It made no finding that using a 
joint custody worksheet to calculate child support would be "unjust, inappropriate, 
or not in the best interest of the child" as required by §78-45-7.2(2)&(3) referred to 
above. 
Absent the court reversing the trial court's order of using a sole-custody 
worksheet, the court should remand to the trial court directing it to enter specific 
findings supporting a rebuttal of the presumption of using a joint custody worksheet 
under the circumstances of this case. 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. UDYS 
MOTION BROUGHT UNDER URCP RULE 60 FOR 
CORRECTION OF JUDICIAL LEGAL ERROR. 
On or about October 1, 1993, Mr. Udy brought a Motion under Rules 59 and 
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate his child support obligation using 
a Joint Physical Custody Worksheet. Said Motion was opposed by Mrs. Udy in her 
response filed on or about 13,1993. The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision 
denying Mr. Udy's Motion on November 23,1993 and entered the same on November 
24, 1993. An Order denying Mr. Udy's Motion was signed on December 8, 1993, and 
entered by the trial Court on December 10, 1993. Mr. Udy pursues this appeal 
regarding the aforesaid denial. Pursuant to an Order dated and entered on February 
7, 1994 by this Court, Mr. Udy's appeal is limited to the issue brought in his Motion 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is procedurally proper for an issue concerning judicial legal error to be 
brought under Rule 60(b). Said rule provides in part, as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;... or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment 
(Emphasis added) 
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On a number of occasions, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have dealt 
with issues brought by motions under URCP Rule 60(b). Nevertheless, very few Utah 
cases address the propriety of applying said rule to judicial legal error. Where Utah's 
decisions may lack specificity, as to employing Rule 60(b) to address judicial 
nonclerical error, the decisions of other jurisdictions lend clarity to support its 
appropriateness. 
The trial court's decision to calculate child support using a sole custody 
worksheet, notwithstanding the court's provision of a joint physical custody 
parenting/residential schedule, may be challenged under two concepts: First, that 
"mistake" as included in reason (1), applies to judicial nonclerical error; and 
alternatively under reason (7), that equity and fairness justify relief from the 
consequences of thus calculating child support under the visitation schedule ordered. 
A. "Mistake" as included in reason (1) of Rule 60(b), applies to 
judicial nonclerical substantial error. 
1. Utah Decisions - Controlling Authority. 
The decisions rendered in Utah support the propriety of a Rule 60(b) motion 
addressing judicial, nonclerical error under the category of mistake of reason (1) 
thereunder. 
Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970), distinguished between a 
motion addressing clerical error, properly brought under subsection (a) of Rule 60, 
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and a motion for judicial error under subsection (b) of the rule: 
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does 
not depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was 
made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered. (Emphasis added) 
The instant case involves the error made by the trial court in rendering the 
judgment concerning the support ordered for a child. 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), dealt with a Rule 60(b) motion to 
set aside a default judgment establishing paternity and support for an unrepresented 
minor child. The court noted at 55, 
[A] judgment in a paternity case may affect the rights and 
interests of the child, who is almost always unrepresented in a paternity 
proceeding. 
In the instant case, the interest of the child were a matter of 
concern to the trial court at the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion. 
Though the Larsen Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the HLA tests 
were sufficiently conclusive to establish paternity, it reversed the child support 
judgment and remanded for evidentiary hearing on the issue of the child support 
award. Larsen points out the importance to the child of equitable and legally correct 
determinations of child support, where the father sought under Rule 60(b), a 
recalculation of support to effect a reduction of the same. 
See also, Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1982) 
(Mistake of law raises a rule 60(b)(1) issue.) 
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2. Decisions of Other Jurisdictions - Persuasive Authority. 
The decisions rendered in other jurisdictions provide authority recognizing the 
propriety of using a Rule 60(b) motion to correct judicial nonclerical error. The cases 
support that "mistake" referred to in reason (1) of the rule includes mistake on the 
part of the court, and should be construed to authorized relief from a substantive 
error of law by the court, upon a proper motion made within a reasonable time, not 
exceeding the time allowed for appeal from the judgment, where such error is 
apparent upon the record. Said cases argue that the trial court should have power 
to correct its own judicial error under the time constraints of the rule, that the word 
"mistake" is broader that the phrase "error of law apparent upon the record," and 
that, so limited, a motion for such relief under Rule 60(b)(1) infuses the needed 
flexibility into the procedure and allows the trial court to correct judicial error that 
must otherwise be corrected by appeal. 
In actual practice, a number of courts have held or recognized that correcting 
judicial error, mistake, or granting relief with respect thereto, is authorized by or 
permissible under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter 
FRCP). Said part of the Federal Rule is identical to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
A motion for relief under FRCP Rule 60(b)(1) is a sound procedural device for 
correcting a trial judge's error, for it allows a trial judge an opportunity to correct his 
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or her own error, thereby either obviating an appeal or at least demonstrating to the 
appellate court that the question was squarely presented and passed on below. 
In Rumsey v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 580 F.Supp. 1052, 1054 
(1984), the Court stated: 
[Defendants argue that Rule 60(b) cannot provide the basis for 
relief from the judgment of a court if the only ground asserted in 
support of the motion is a substantive error by the court. This Court 
rejects defendant's reasoning in this regard as a basis for a denial of the 
instant motion. 
On balance, this Court concludes that judicial error may be 
corrected pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, see Compton v. Alton 
Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d (4th Cir. 1979), provided the movant is not 
thereby permitted to avoid the time constraints required for taking a 
timely appeal. "Under such circumstances there is indeed good sense in 
permitting the [district] court to correct its own error...; no good purpose 
is served by requiring the parties to appeal to a higher court, often 
requiring remand for further...proceedings, when the [district] court is 
equally able to correct its decisions.../' Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d at 
531 (2nd Cir. 1964). 
In Jones v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212-213 (1984), the Court 
confirmed the propriety of using a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to correct substantive judicial 
error, stating: 
The mistake in the present case affects the substantive rights of 
the parties. It is not clerical, and if in fact occurred, it is one of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect governed by Rule 60(b)(1).... 
Likewise, in Parks v. U. S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 839-840 (1982), 
the court stated: 
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Rule 60(b)(1) authorized a court to grant relief from judgments for 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The "mistakes" 
of judges may be remedied under this provision. Meadows v. Cohen, 
409 F.2d 750, 752 n.4 5th Cir. 1969). The rule encompasses mistakes 
in the application of the law. Oliver v. Home Indemnity Co., 470 F.2d 
329 5th Cir. 1972). 
The policy favoring such a construction is, of course, one aimed at 
preventing the unnecessary wasting of energies by both appellate 
courts and litigants. It seems that absent the chance of serious 
injury to the rights of any party, the possible saving of judicial 
energies warrants the use of such a discretionary reconsideration 
by the district court. 
470 F.2d at 331 (footnote omitted) 
Judicial economy and common sense dictated filing a 60(b) motion 
before the trial court rather than arguing the new law before the 
appeals court. 
Permitting the district court to have the first bite at the issue is 
a direct way of reaching a problem which otherwise can be 
attacked circuitously-if the motion were addressed to this court 
we could remand with directions to the district court to consider 
it, or we could affirm subject to the district court's considering the 
motion. Aldridge v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 457 F.2d 501 
(C.A.5, 1972). [Quoting Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 
F.2d 928, at 931 (5th Cir. 1976)] 
In Oliver v. Home Indemnity Company, 470 F.2d 329, 330-331 (5th Cir. 1972), 
recognizing that the movant brought his Rule 60(b) motion, "[a]fter the normal ten-
day period for amending final judgments had elapsed, but before the thirty-day period 
for filing notice of appeal,...", the Court then stated: 
The district court found that it could entertain Pruitt's motion for 
reconsideration under the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, (footnote omitted) The district court adopted a 
construction of that rule which read the term "mistake" to encompass 
38 
judicial mistake in applying the appropriate law. This view of the rule 
is that urged by the most noted commentators, 3 Barron & Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, §1325 at 407 (Wright ed. 1958); 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice, §60.22(3) (1971),.... (citations omitted) 
The policy favoring such a construction is, of course, one aimed at 
preventing the unnecessary wasting of energies by both appellate courts 
and litigants. It seems that absent the chance of serious injury to the 
rights of any party, the possible saving of judicial energies warrants the 
use of such a discretionary reconsideration by the district court, 
(footnote omitted) 
Also see, Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 852 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 
1988) (Rule 60(b)(1) permits court to relieve party from final judgment for 
inadvertence, inadvertence can be on part of court rather than parties), Pitts v. 
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171, 173 (Utah 1977) (Differentiation between "mistake" and 
"inadvertence" not germane), Welsh v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 595 F.Supp 844 (1984) 
(Relief granted under Rule 60(b)(1) from judgment on grounds of judicial mistake, 
legal or deliberative error), Rodriquez v. Bowen, 678 F.Supp. 1456 (E.D.Cal. 1988) 
(Court may correct errors of law upon motion under Rule 60(b)(1), and Compton v. 
Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979) (Rule 60(b) does not confine 
"mistake", for which vacation of judgment may be had, to mistake by the moving 
party, especially if raised within the time allowed for appeal.) 
B. Alternatively to judicial nonclerical "mistake" of reason (1) of Rule 
60(b): clause (7) of said rule, "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment", should apply in equity and 
fairness. 
If the Court determines for some reason that clause (1) of Rule 60(b) does not 
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apply in this matter, Mr. Udy argues that his 60(b) motion justifies relief in equity 
and fairness under clause (7). 
1. Utah Decisions 
To Appellant's counsel's knowledge, there have been few decisions rendered in 
Utah touching on clause (7) of URCP Rule 60(b). In one case, Laub v. South Central 
Utah Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), the Court reviewed a Rule 60(b)(7) 
motion for judicial nonclerical error, brought more than three months after entry of 
judgment. It concluded, "since subdivision (1) is appUcable to the instant case, 
subdivision (7) cannot be used to circumvent the three-month filing period". Laub, 
at 1308. In specifying the criteria under which clause (7) may be employed, the Court 
stated: 
Subdivision (7) is the residuary clause of rule 60(b); it embodies 
three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed 
in subdivision (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and 
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time. 
Laub, at 1306. 
2. Decisions from Other Jurisdictions. 
By far the majority of motions brought under the residuary clause which have 
been denied in other jurisdictions, have been so denied for failure to bring the 
motions within the time requirements of clauses (1) through (6) of the rule to which 
said motions actually applied. Resorting to the simple "reasonable" time requirement 
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of clause (7) was to no avail for such motions. There should be no question by the 
court that Mr. Udy's motion was made within the requisite time. 
It should first be noted that clause (6) of the Federal RCP Rule 60(b) is 
identical to clause (7) of Utah RCP Rule 60(b). 
In Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1979), the Court 
identifies the appropriateness of avoiding an exact categorization of clauses when 
moving under Rule 60(b) or alternatively asserting multiple clauses in support of the 
motion.12 It then notes that, 
Subdivision (b)(6) authorized relief for "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." This has been described as 
the "catch-all" clause (citation omitted), because it provides the court 
with "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular 
12
 These grounds for relief often overlap and it is 
difficult, if not inappropriate, in many cases to specify or 
restrict the claim for relief to a particular itemized ground. As 
one court has well put it, "[t]he rule [60(b)] is broadly phrased 
and many of the itemized grounds are overlapping, freeing Courts to 
do justice in hard cases where the circumstances generally measure 
up to one or more of the itemized grounds." In fact, Professor 
Moore has suggested that exact "categorization" of ground for 
relief under the rule "should be avoided except where the category-
is obvious or where exact choice is necessary to decision." 7 
Moore's Federal Practice §60.27[1] at pp. 346-47. But where the 
movant has shown a meritorious defense, the itemized grounds for 
relief under the rule "are to be liberally construed...". * * * In 
short, any considerations of the need "to expedite cases, to fully 
utilize the court's time, to reduce overcrowded calendars and to 
establish finality of judgments * * * should never be used to 
thwart the objective of the blind goddess" of justice itself. 
(Citation omitted) 
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case/1 7 Moore, §60.27[2] at 375 (citation omitted), and "vests power in 
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such 
action is appropriate to accomplish justice," Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. at 615, 69 S.Ct. at 390, where relief might not be available 
under any other clause in 60(b), (citation omitted). This is just such an 
extraordinary case where this "catch-all ground was intended to afford 
relief (Emphasis in original) (At 106-107) 
In Compton the trial judge simply misconstrued the applicable statute and 
entered judgment in an amount far in excess of that allowed thereunder: 
Unfortunately, the district judge completely misconstrued the 
statute in question. In correcting his mistake and in relieving the 
defendant of an invalid judgment in an unconscionable amount, we are 
doing what we are convinced the district judge in this case would have 
done himself, had he not misconstrued the statute. But, whether this 
be true or not, fundamental fairness and considerations of justice, apart 
from any question of the voidness of the judgment as a matter of law, 
command that the judgment for statutory penalty wages be vacated. (At 
107) 
In the instant case, when the trial judge ruled at the conclusion of the trial and 
later on Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) motion, he likewise misconstrued the governing statute 
concerning the amount of child support appropriate under the residential/parenting 
schedule ordered. A joint custody worksheet should have been used to calculate child 
support. Fundamental fairness and consideration of justice command that Mr. Udy 
pay $53.00, or at best $112.00, not $273.00 per month, to Mrs. Udy. 
In United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D 506 (1949), the Court granted the 
defendants' motion to vacate judgment where plaintiff sought, 
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to enforce against the defendants treble damages on an alleged violation 
predicated on a pure guess as to the base amount of the sales for a given 
period. This to my mind is clearly unconscionable and places the case 
squarely within the purview of the sixth category of Amended Rule 60(b) 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
(emphasis added) 
The Miller court found that the judgment entered was not for a sum certain 
as required by rule. In the instant case, ordering the calculation of child support 
using a sole-custody worksheet, was predicated on a pure guess that the label of a 
sole-custody award to Mrs. Udy, overrode the "Joint physical custody" definition of 
Utah Code Section 78-45-2(7). 
See also, In Re Crafty Fox, Ltd., 3 B.R. 657, 661 (1980) (Ordering 
reconsideration of judgment challenged under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) for misapplication 
of law relating to attorney's fees.), United States v. McDonald, 86 F.R.D. 204, 206 
and 209) (1980) (Amending foreclosure order under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) to include 
appellants' homestead interest finding facts to constitute "exceptional 
circumstances".), United States v. Cato Brothers, Inc., 273 f.2d 153 (4th Cir 1959) 
(Subsection (6) of FRCP 60(b) should be applied in liberal spirit and take into 
consideration all of the circumstances of the case.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua 46% of the total time and 33% of 
the overnights. Due to said schedule Mr. Udy contributes more than Three Hundred 
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Dollars ($300.00) per month directly to the financial benefit of Joshua. Under the 
child support guidelines definition of "joint physical custody", the aforesaid factors 
dictate that a "joint-custody worksheet" be used in calculating child support. The trial 
Court erred in ordering the parties to calculate child support by using a "sole-custody 
worksheet under the facts of this case. 
The trial Court's order deviates from the child support guidelines. The trial 
Court made no findings which support a deviation from the guideUnes, nor any 
findings showing why the guidelines should be rebutted in this case. 
Mr. Udy properly brought his Rule 60 Motion before the trial Court to correct 
its legal, non-clerical error. The trial Court erred in denying his Rule 60 motion. 
This Court should reverse the trial Court's order of using a "sole-custody 
worksheet" to calculate child support and direct the trial court to compute child 
support using a "joint-physical custody" worksheet. The trial Court should be 
directed to enter a support order of $53.00 per month based on the 46% total time 
Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua. In the alternative, the trial Court 
should be directed to enter a support order for $112.00 per month based on the 33% 
of the overnights Joshua spends with Mr. Udy. 
In the alternative to reversal, this Court should remand this matter to the trial 
Court with directions to enter findings which may support a deviation from the child 
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support guidelines and which could rebut the presumption of the guidelines being 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this day ofcAprrl, 1994. 
irne Jeff 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Q day of 1994, I mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Marlin J. Grant, #4581 
OLSON & HOGAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY J. UDY, 
vs. 
REBECCA UDY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924000268DA 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on September 
1, 1993 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. before the Honorable 
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, presiding and sitting without a 
jury. The plaintiff was personally present in court and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm 
of Mann, Hadfield and Thorne. The defendant was personally 
present in court and was represented by her counsel of record, 
Marlin J. Grant of the firm of Olson & Hoggan. The plaintiff was 
sworn and testified and presented his evidence by way of 
additional witnesses and exhibits, and the defendant testified 
and presented her evidence by way of additional witnesses and 
exhibits. The court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, .... . . ,/fa^O(^)(rV. ^ k> 
DEC ) 1993 
*v -\L ^ U ^ K J ^ Q 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The plaintiff shall be awarded a decree of divorce from the 
defendant; said divorce to become final upon signing by the 
court. 
2. CUSTODY 
The care, custody and control of the minor child, JOSHUA J. 
UDY, born August 1, 1990, shall be awarded to the defendant. 
3. VISITATION 
The court will adopt the legislative guidelines for 
visitation as promulgated under UTAH CODE ANN §30-3-35, and in 
addition will give the following expanded visitation: 
(a) On the weekend in which the father will have 
the child, he may pick the child up Wednesday evening 
at 6:30 p.m. and may keep the child Thursday, Friday, 
Saturday, and shall return the child Sunday at 7:00 
p.m. to the mother's home. 
(b) On the week when the father does not have the 
child for his weekend, he shall be entitled to have the 
child Wednesday evening from 3:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
4. CHILD SUPPORT 
The court shall calculate child support based upon a sole 
custody worksheet. For purposes of computing the child support 
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worksheet, the father will have gross income of $2,786.00 per 
month and the mother will have gross income of $1,720.00 per 
month; the father will receive a credit of $22.00 per month for 
medical insurance which he provides, which leaves the plaintiff 
to pay the sum of $273.00 per month as and for child support for 
the minor child. 
5. CHILD CARE 
Presently the defendant is working and is required to obtain 
child care for the child during the time she works. Each party 
shall be responsible to pay one-half of any child care costs 
reasonably incurred to enable the defendant to work. The child 
care expenses shall follow UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.16 (as 
amended). 
6. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE 
Each party shall be obligated to provide medical and dental 
insurance coverage on the minor child of the parties, so long as 
such insurance coverage is available to each through his or her 
place of employment. The mother shall have primary 
responsibility to provide health and accident insurance, and the 
father shall have secondary responsibility. The parties shall 
each pay one-half of any medical, dental, orthodontic or 
optometric expense incurred for the child not paid by insurance. 
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7. LIFE INSURANCE 
The plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance policy 
(death benefit) on his life in the amount presently in effect 
which is available to him as group term benefit through his 
employment at La-Z-Boy. The plaintiff shall pay or cause to be 
paid the premiums thereon and shall designate the minor child of 
the parties as the beneficiary on said life insurance policy. 
Said life insurance policy and the beneficiary designation shall 
remain in full force and effect until the child reaches the age 
of 18. The plaintiff shall have the right to add additional 
children he may obtain through natural birth or adoption to 
equally share the proceeds. It is the intent of the court that 
said insurance is to guarantee child support in the event of 
plaintiff's death. Should the plaintiff obtain other employment 
where group term insurance is available to him at the same cost 
or less cost as he presently pays, the obligation to provide 
insurance shall remain in effect through his subsequent 
employers. 
8. TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION 
The defendant as custodial parent shall be entitled to the 
tax dependency exemption on the minor child of the parties. 
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9. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The plaintiff shall be awarded as his sole and separate 
property from the marriage all property in his possession and 
defendant shall keep all property in her possession. It being 
the finding of the court that the division as set out herein is 
equal and fair to each party and each party is receiving equal 
value. 
10. REAL PROPERTY 
prior to the marriage the plaintiff purchased a home which 
was used by the parties as their marital home. The court finds 
that there has been very little if any equity accrued in the 
property during the parties were married. The court shall award 
the home and property to the plaintiff free and clear of any 
claim or interest of the defendant. 
11. RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
The plaintiff has accrued a retirement benefit and a 4OIK 
benefit through his employment at La-Z-Boy Corporation. He shall 
be entitled to all of his retirement benefits free and clear of 
any claim of the defendant. The defendant has acquired a 
retirement benefit and 4OIK benefit through her employment at La-
Z-Boy Corporation. She shall be entitled to her retirement 
benefits free and clear of any claim of the defendant. 
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12. DEBTS 
The only debt incurred during the time the parties were 
married is the indebtedness on the home of the parties. The 
plaintiff shall assume and discharge the mortgage on the family 
home and shall hold and save harmless the defendant from any 
liability thereon. Each party shall be responsible for any debts 
each may have incurred since the separation of the parties and 
shall be obligated to pay the same and hold and save harmless the 
other from any liability. 
13. ALIMONY 
The court notes that this has been a short term marriage 
and, therefore, finds that the defendant is not entitled to any 
permanent alimony by virtue of the fact that the marriage has 
been short term. The court further notes that the defendant is 
employed gainfully and has been gainfully employed through the 
marriage; the defendant has not suffered any economic 
disadvantage by virtue of the marriage and, therefore, the 
defendant would not qualify for any short term rehabilitative 
alimony, or any other short term alimony. Therefore, no alimony 
shall be awarded to defendant. 
14. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT OF ASSETS 
Testimony was received that the defendant has incurred 
attorney's fees in excess of $5,000.00. The court notes that the 
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plaintiff also has incurred attorney's fees in a similar amount. 
The court further notes that the parties have expended additional 
monies for home studies. The plaintiff further claims and the 
court does find that at the time of entering into the marriage 
the plaintiff had approximately $3,000.0 in savings, which always 
was maintained during the time the parties were married, and had 
another approximately $3,000.00 in checking which was contributed 
to the marriage. The court further notes that the plaintiff has 
earned during the time the divorce was filed up to the time of 
the trial an additional $6,000.00 over and above what the 
defendant has earned. Accordingly, the court will order that the 
plaintiff pay to the defendant the sum of $1,500.00 to equalize 
the savings differential and earnings differential as well as 
attorney fees. Judgment may enter against the plaintiff in favor 
of the defendant in the amount of $1,500.00 which shall accrue 
interest after signing at the judgment rate. 
15. DIVORCE FINAL UPON SIGNING 
Good cause appearing to the court, this divorce decree shall 
become final upon signing by the court. 
DATED this M^ day of October, 1993. 
GORDON J. LOW 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of November, 1993, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to 
Marlin J. Grant, Attorney for Defendant, 123 East Main, P. 0. Box 
115, Tremonton, Utah 84337. 
n 
&^r\s> /Tshs-
Secr^t^fy / / 
pj:3/udy.ad 
8 
Exhibit "B" 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
OLSON Sc HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRADLEY J. UDY, 
vs. 
REBECCA UDY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 924000268 
OLSON & HOGGAN P C 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
66 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 529 
LOGAN UTAH 6 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5 
( 6 0 1 ) 7 5 2 1551 
TREMONTON OFTICE 
I 2 3 EAST MAIN 
P O BOX 115 
TREMONTON UTAH 6 4 3 3 7 
(601)257 3665 
Plaintiff filed a motion to have the Court reconsider, 
pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60, Plaintiff's request to base child 
support upon a joint custody worksheet. Defendant filed an 
objection. The Court has review the arguments and based on 
Defendant's objections and arguments cited therein orders as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion is denied. 
2. Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce, 
based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's response. 
DATED this ? day of December, 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
j u ^ 
Jeff\j£y thorne 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
.*. Uu^!±L^ MJG/div/udy.ord 
CfC JJ31993 
Exhibit "C" 
BUDGET 
Mountain Fuel 
Utah Power & Light 
Tremonton City 
Insight Cable 
GTE Telephone 
Life Insurance 
House Payment 
Kidsland Daycare 
Child Support 
Food for Josh and Brad 
Clothes - Brad 
Clothes - Josh 
Josh's Book Club 
Automotive Expenses 
Gift Fund 
Misc. Spending Money 
Emergency Fund - Savings 
Doctor/Dentist/Medication 
$ 44.95 
17.78 
30.82 
38.35 
28.49 
30.00 
461.50 
118.44 
275.00 
148.01 
33.33 
20.83 
13.00 
113.88 
79.17 
173.33 
216.67 
43.82 
$1,887.37 
I PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT; •f-93\ 
Explaination of Monthly Budget 
1992 
Mt. Fuel 
Ut Power 
City 
GTE 
Cable 
Life Ins 
Aug 
12.89 
25.13 
42.55 
27.32 
38.35 
30.00 
House payment 
Kidsland Daycare 
Child Support 
Food-Josh 
Clothes -
Clothes -
& Brad 
Brad 
Josh 
Josh's Book Club 
Sept 
19.49 
11.32 
29.75 
30.02 
38.35 
30.00 
$213. 
From 
From 
From 
From 
Oct 
38.88 
16.92 
29.75 
32.18 
38.35 
30.00 
Nov 
81.67 
17.66 
29.75 
27.21 
38.35 
30.00 
Dec 
95.29 
22.07 
29.75 
26.00 
38.35 
30.00 
00 bi-weekly $213 x 26 = 
1-
8-
8-
8-
-1-93 
-1-92 
-1-92 
-1-92 
thru 6-3C 
thru 8-1-
thru 8-1-
thru 8-1-
1993 
Jan 
88.83 
18.50 
29.75 
28.91 
38.35 
30.00 
$5,538. 
Feb 
79.45 
13.41 
29.75 
32.99 
38.35 
30.00 
00 = 
>-93, I paid a total of 
93, I spent a total of 
93, I spent approximately 
93, I spent approximately 
Mar 
47.34 
17.14 
29.75 
29.04 
38.35 
30.00 
$ 710. 
$1,776. 
$400. 
$250. 
64 
12 
00 
00 
Apr 
35.04 
16.24 
29.75 
27.18 
38.35 
30.00 
f 6 
- 12 
* 12 
f 12 
May 
15.32 
14.90 
29.75 
28.18 
38.35 
30.00 
= 
= 
as 
= 
= 
June 
13.64 
22.00 
29.75 
29.66 
38.35 
30.00 
July 
11.53 
18.04 
29.75 
23.17 
38.35 
30.00 
$ 
Month 
Ave. 
44.95 
17.78 
30.82 
28.49 
38.35 
30.00 
1 461.50 
118.44 
275.00 
148.01 
33.33 
20.83 
13.00 
Auto Expenses 
Gift Fund 
Misc. Spending 
Savings 
Medical 
Insurance $594.60, Gas $450, Service $80, 
License $121.96, Inspection, $20, Repair $100 = $1,366.56 f 12 
Xmas,B-Day,M/F Day immediate family = $200, Josh $300, 
Brad $200, Grandparents $120, Nieces & Nephews $90, 
Friends, misc. $40, = $950.00 f 12 = 
Dining out, work breaks, recreation, misc. $40 per week x 52 = $2080 
Josh's college, unexpected expenses, truck downpayment, vacation, 
future investments, emergency fund-maintain 6 months wages in 
case of lost employment @ $50.00 per week x 52 = $2,600 : 12 = 
From 8-1-92 thru 8-1-93, I spent approximately $525.84 f 12 = 
r 12 « 
113.88 
79. 
173. 
216, 
43 
17 
,33 
.67 
.82 
$1,877.37 
E x h i b i t "DM 
78-44-40 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 79-44-39, enac t ed by L. 
1983, ch. 164, ft 1. 
78-44-40. Application and construction of chapter . 
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter 
among states enacting it. 
History: C. 1953, 78-44-40, enac ted by L. 
1983, ch. 164, 9 1. 
Severabil i ty Clauses . — Section 2 of Laws 
1983, ch 164 provided "If any provision of this 
chapter or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications of this chapter which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or applica-
tion, and to this end the provisions of this chap-
ter are severable w 
CHAPTER 45 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
SUPPORT ACT 
Section 
78-45-1 
78 45-2 
78-45-3 
78-45 4 
78 45 4 1 
78-45-4 2 
78-45-4 3 
78-45 5 
78-45-6 
78-45-7 
78-45-7 1 
78-45-7 2 
78 45-7 3 
78-45-7 4 
78 45 7 5 
78 45 7 6 
Short title 
Definitions 
Duty of man 
Duty of woman 
Duty of stepparent to support 
stepchild — Effect of termi-
nation of marriage or com-
mon law relationship 
Natural or adoptive parent has 
primary obligation of support 
— Right of stepparent to re-
cover support 
Ward of state — Primary obli-
gation to support 
Duty of obligor regardless of 
presence or residence of obli-
gee 
District court jurisdiction 
Determination of amount of 
support — Rebuttable guide-
lines 
Medical and dental expenses of 
dependent children — As-
signing responsibility for 
payment — Insurance cover-
age 
Application of guidelines — Re-
buttal 
Procedure — Documentation — 
Stipulation 
Obligation — Adjusted gross in-
come used 
Determination of gross income 
— Imputed income 
Adjusted gross income 
Section 
78-45-7 7 
78-45-7 8 
78-45-7 9 
78-45-7 10 
78-45-7 11 
78-45-7 12 
78-45-7 13 
78-45-7 14 
78-45-7 15 
78-45-7 16 
78-45-7 17 
78-45-7 18 
78-45-7 19 
78-45-8 
78-45-9 
78-45-9 1 
78-45-9 2 
78-45-10 
78-45-11 
78-45-12 
78-45-13 
Calculation of obligations 
Split custody — Obligation cal-
culations 
Joint physical custody — Obli-
gation calculations 
Reduction when child becomes 
18 
Reduction for extended visita-
tion 
Income in excess of tables 
Advisory committee — Mem-
bership and functions 
Child support obligation table. 
Medical and dental expenses — 
Insurance 
Child care expenses — Ex-
penses not incurred 
Child care costs 
Limitation on amount of sup-
port ordered 
Determination of parental lia-
bility 
Continuing jurisdiction 
Enforcement of right of support 
Repealed 
County attorney to assist obli-
gee 
Appeals 
Husband and wife privileged 
communication inapplicable 
— Competency of spouses 
Rights are in addition to those 
presently existing 
Interpretation and construc-
tion 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 7 8 - 4 5 - 2 
78-45-1. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110. f 1. port Act are California, Maine, and New 
Meaning of "this a c t " — The term "(tlhis Hampshire 
set," as used in this section, means Laws 1957, Cross-References. — Income withholding, 
ch 110, which enacted 18 78-45 1 to 78-45-4, ft* 62A 11-401 to 62A 11-414 
78-45-5 to 78-45-7, 78-45-8, 78-45-9, and Public support of children. W 62A-11-301 to 
78-45-10 to 78-45-13 62A 11 332 
Uniform Lawa. — Other jurisdictions Uniform child custody jurisdiction, Chapter 
adopting the Uniform Civil Liability for Sup- 45c of this title 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brifham Young Law Review. — Note, Modem status of views as to validity of pre-
J W.F v Schoolcraft The Husband's Rights to marital agreements contemplating divorce or 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, separation, 53 A L R 4th 22 
1989 B.Y U L Rev 955 Enforceability of premarital agreements 
A.L.R. — Postmajonty disability as reviving governing support or property rights upon di-
parenUl duty to support child, 48 A L R 4th v o r c e o r separation as afTected by circum-
gjg stances surrounding execution — modern sta-
Child support court's authority to reinsti- t U 8 ' 5 3 A L R 4 t h 8 5 
tute parent's support obligation after terms of 
prior decree have been fulfilled, 48 A L R 4th 
953 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 
78-45-7.6(1). 
(2) "Base child support award" means the award calculated using the 
guidelines before additions for uninsured medical expenses and work-re-
lated child care costs. 
(3) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support ta-
ble," or "table" means the table in Section 78-45-7 14 
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and a 
son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and 
is without sufficient means. 
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or oth-
erwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension or 
retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings specifi-
cally includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital 
assets. 
(61 "Guidelines" means _the child support, guidelines in Sections 
78-45-7.2 through 78-45-7.18. 
(7) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent 
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paving child support. 
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed 
(9) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support 
(10) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a step-
parent. 
H-45-7.6 JUDICIAL CODE 
lated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come 
(bt Each parent shall provide suitable docu 
mentation of current earnings, including year to-
date pay stubs or employer statements Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income 
from nonearned sources according to the source 
Verification of income from records maintained 
by the'Office of Employment Security may be 
•substituted for employer statements and income 
tax returns 
<c> Historical and current earnings shall be 
used to determine whether an underemployment 
or overemployment situation exists 
<fi> Gross income includes income imputed to the 
arent under Subsection (7) 
<7> <a> Income may not be imputed to a parent un 
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed 
<b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in 
tome shall be based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived from work his 
tnrv occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community 
<c» If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a 40 hour work week To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
ing or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation 
«d» Income may not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist 
(iI the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn, 
(n> a parent is physically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage, 
<iii) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills, 
or 
(ivi unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent's pres-
ence in the home 
<8> ia> Gross income may not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income 
«b» Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of that parent 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case itto 
8 45-7 6 Adjusted gross income. 
11» As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in 
ome' is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
TOSS income alimony previously ordered and paid 
nd child support previously ordered 
• 2> The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
that in determining the child support, the guidelines 
do not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
mony isss 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be 
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted 
gross incomes 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
split custody as defined in Section 78-45 2, the total 
child support award shall be determined as follows 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income, and subtracting 
from the products the children's portion of any 
monthly payments made directly by each parent 
for medical and dental insurance premiums 
(c) Allocate monthly work related child care 
costs equally to each parent 
<d> Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the 
base child support obligation calculated in Sub-
section (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Sub-
section (2Mc> Include in the order both amounts 
and the total child support award 
(3) The base combined child support obligation ta-
ble provides combined child support obligations for up 
to ten children For more than ten children, addi-
tional amounts shall be added to the base child sup-
port obligation shown The amount shown on the ta-
ble is the support amount for the total number of 
children, not an amount per child itso 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of split custody, the total child support 
award shall be determined as follows 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table Allocate a portion of the calcu-
lated amount between the parents in proportion 
to the number of children for whom each parent 
has physical custody The amounts so calculated 
are a tentative base child support obligation due 
each parent from the other parent for support of 
the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support 
obligation due each parent by the percentage 
that the other parent's adjusted gross income 
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income 
of both parents 
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
<2) the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums 
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(31 from the larger amount to determine the base 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation 
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related 
JUDICIAL CODE 78-45-7.14 
(6) Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the base child support award calculated 
in Subsection (41 and the amount allocated in 
Subsection (5) Include both amounts and the 
total child support award in the child support 
order ISM 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation 
calculations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child 
support award shall be determined as follows 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com 
bined adjusted gross income The amounts so cal-
culated are a tentative base child support obhga 
tion due from each parent for support of the chil 
dren 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child 
support obligation by the percentage of time the 
children spend with the other parent to deter-
mmr .fiflfii parent a tentative obligation to the 
other parenl 
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(31 the children's portion of any monthly pay 
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums 
(51 Calculate the base child support award to 
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser 
amount calculated in Subsection (41 from the 
larger amount 
(61 Allocate the combined work-related child 
care costs of the parents equally to each parent to 
obtain the other parent's tentative child care ob-
ligation 
(7) (a) Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (51 must pay when the obligee 
has physical custody by 
(i) adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection (51. 
and 
(ii) adding the amount of the child 
care obligation allocated to the obligor 
in Subsection (61 
(bl Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent 
has physical custody by 
(il adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection <5l, 
and 
(nl subtracting the amount of the 
child care obligation allocated to the ob-
ligee in Subsection (6) 
(8) Include the amounts determined in Subsec-
tions (7Hal and (b» and the two total child support 
awards in the child support order isss 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base 
combined child support award is automatically re-
duced to reflect the lower base combined child sup-
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless other 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child 
amount derived from the base child support award 
originally ordered isss 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
<1> The child support order shall provide that the 
base child support award be reduced bv 50** for each 
child for time periods during which the order grants 
specific extended visitation for that child for at least 
25 of any 30 consecutive days Only the base child 
support award is affected by the 50'* abatement The 
amount to be paid for work related child care costs 
may be suspended if the costs are not incurred during 
the extended visitation 
<2> For purposes of this section the per child 
amount to which the abatement applies shall be cal 
culated by dividing the base child support award by 
the number of children included in the award iseo 
78-45-7.12 Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate 
and just child support amount mav be ordered, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children 
due support isss 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership 
and functions. 
(Il On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1 1991. and 
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subse 
quently. the governor shall appoint an advisory com 
mtttee consisting of 
(a) two representatives recommended by the 
Office of Recovery Services 
<b» two representatives recommended by the 
Judicial Council, 
<c) two representatives recommended by the 
Utah State Bar Association and 
<d) an uneven number of additional persons, 
not to exceed five, who represent diverse inter 
ests related to child support issues, as the gover 
nor may consider appropriate However, none of 
the individuals appointed under this subsection 
may be members of the Utah State Bar Associa 
tion 
(21 (a) The advisory committee shall review the 
child support guidelines to ensure their applies 
tion results in the determination of appropriate 
child support award amounts 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legisla 
tive Judiciary Interim Committee on or before 
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or be 
fore October I of every fourth year subsequently 
<c> The committee's report shall include recom 
mendations of the majority of the committee, as 
well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee 
(31 The committee members serve without compen 
sation Staff for the committee shall be provided from 
the existing budgets of the Department of Human 
Services and the Judicial Council The committee 
ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent 
committee under this section is appointed itto 
78-45-7.14. Child support obligation table. 
The following is the Base Combined Child Support 
Okl >«•«»». T»W1» 
Exhibit "E" 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY 
REBECCA 
J. UDY 
vs. 
UDY 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY) 
Civil No, 924000268da 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION Mother Father Combined 
1. Number of natural and adopted 
children of this mother and father 
for whom support is to be awarded. 
^.•-•-•.•.•.•-•.•.•-•••-•«' 
2. No. of nights children will spend 
with each parent (must total 3 65). 
245 120 365 
3. Percentage of time each parent 
has the children. 67.12 % 32.88 % JH 
IF LINE 3 IS 25% OR LESS FOR EITHER PARENT USE SOLE CUSTODY WORKSHEET. 
4a. Gross monthly income. 1720 2786 K^SSS:* 
4b. Previously ordered alimony paid-
«-:•:-:-:•>:-: 
4c. Previously ordered child support. 
4d. Optional: Share of Child Support 
Obligation for children in present 
home. 
5. Adjusted monthly gross. 1720 2786 4506 
6. Base Combined Child Support Oblig. 
-x«:::-x*x-:::*x,-:*A-:-x^W£x; 477 
7. Percentage of COMBINED Obligation. 38.17 % 61.83 % K-X-X-X-X-" 
8. Each parent's share of Obligation. 182 295 M-X-X-X-: 
9. Mother's obligation to father, 60 
10. Father's obligation to mother. X
taX*X'X<-X"X-X«X,,X-XO0,> 
•2"2*A*s»A-A-:-A-:Wx£A-A%Wc 198 
11. Children's portion of monthly med-
ical and dental insurance premiums 
paid to insurance company. 22 
"~"~"jE::«E:SS:$A 
« • » : • : • 
12. Total monthly childcare expense 
for the children in line 1 
incurred by either parent. 
5$:£5SSx"$3 
-S-X-;-5-3-X-X«X-S*X-I-w*X>,Xi»S!HC 
13. Subtotal child support award. 60 176 
14. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: OBLIGOR pays this to 
OBLIGEE all 12 months of the year. 
15. CHILD CARE AWARD: OBLIGOR'S share of child 
care expense when actually incurred. 
116 
VAH 0O&L 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY 
REBECCA 
J . UDY 
v s . 
UDY: __ 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY) 
Civil No. 924000268da 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION Mother Father Combined 
Number of natural and adopted 
children of this mother and father 
for whom support is to be awarded. 
»»>»;• 
2. No. of nights children will spend 
with each parent (must total 365), 
197 168 365 
3. Percentage of time each parent 
has the children. 53.97 % 46.03 % 
IF LINE 3 IS 25% OR LESS FOR EITHER PARENT USE SOLE CUSTODY WORKSHEET, 
4a. Gross monthly income. 1720 2786 
4b. Previously ordered alimony paid. 
4c. Previously ordered child support. 
4d. Optional: Share of Child Support 
Obligation for children in present 
home. 
5. Adjusted monthly gross, 1720 2786 4506 
6. Base Combined Child Support Oblig. :-»x->:»>»c->»r-»x-x«c«|» 477 
7. Percentage of COMBINED Obligation, 38.17 % 61.83 % c-»»»r« 
8. Each parent's share of Obligation. 182 295 br-^ vw.-.*.':-. 
9. Mother's obligation to father. 84 
10. Father's obligation to mother. >>>>C;>>X*>>>X^X
,C*>>5*!l,C"> 159 
11. Children's portion of monthly med-
ical and dental insurance premiums 
paid to insurance company. 22 
12. Total monthly childcare expense 
for the children in line 1 
incurred by either parent. 
»»i*>;->»»»r-»»»3<»> 
13. Subtotal child support award. 84 137 
14. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: OBLIGOR pays this to 
OBLIGEE all 12 months of the year. 
15. CHILD CARE AWARD: OBLIGOR'S share of child 
care expense when actually incurred. 
53 
chqbo 
Court granted visitation = 48 weeks 
Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. 
X X X X 
6:00 p.m. 
Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. 
X X 
return 3:30 p.m. 
7:00 p.m. 10:00 p.m. 
96 Overnight stays - Court granted visitation 
24 Overnight stays - Four week summer visitation 
120 Total overnight stays = 33 % 
24 Additional days on Sundays from early morning until 
7:00 p.m. - Court granted visitation 
24 Additional days on Wednesdays from after work, 3:30 p.m. 
until 10:00 p.m. - Court granted visitation 
168 Days and Nights = 46 % 
Q5HD0C&bS 
QryjL£UVLZSL^ 
Exhibit "F" 
lid-June 1991 
XINT 
CUS7C0Y 
States with vanations to accomodate joint custody or 
extended visitation 
Alaska: Both for joint custody, and visitation over 27 
consecutive days 
Anzona: "...court may deviate from..guidelines...after 
considenng...percentage of time each parent has physical 
custody of the children,..." 
Arkansas: " ..factors may warrant adjustments...The 
extraordinary time spent with the non-custodial parent, or 
shared or joint custody arrangements." 
Colorado:: "Where each parent exercises extensive physical 
custody....child support obligations be computed for each 
parent...by the percentage of time the child spends with the 
other parent the respective child support obligations are 
then offset..." 
Connecticut: "Joint or shared custody arrangements and 
extended periods of visitation...have substantial impact on 
the allocation of financial responsibilities...and should be 
carefully explored." 
Flonda: "It is the public policy of this state to assure that each 
minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents after the parents separate or the marnage of the 
parties is dissolved and to encourage the parents to share 
the nghts and responsibilities of childreanng." "The court 
may adjust the minimum child support award....upon the 
following considerations: The particular shared parental 
arrangement, such as where the secondary residential 
parent spends a great deal of time with the children thereby 
reducing the financial expenditures incurred by the pnmary 
residential parent..." 
Georgia: " ..factors which may warrant such variations 
include,...Shared physical custody arrangements, including 
extended visitation;../ 
ie Joint Custody Association, Page 1 The Joint Custody Association, Page 2 
Guam *lt is the intention of these guidelines to remove 
financial incentives associated with custody and visitation 
arrangements Shared custody shall warrant child support 
less than provided in these guidelines only where the court 
specifies and apportions an offsetting amount of the 
children s expenses to the parent paying support" "Extra 
expenses from shared or joint custody - Describe any 
extraordinary expenses that will affect only the paying parent 
in a joint/shared custody situation " "Visitation expenses -
Describe the anticipated visitation plan and related costs Tell 
how you think the cost should be divided between the 
parents M 
Hawaii "Where parties share physical custody on an equal 
basis, each will be considered to have the child for six 
months dunng the course of a year" "To avoid unnecessary 
transfers of funds, the "pay our of each parent for the year 
should be determined by multiplying the monthly support 
obligation times six months the excess amnount shall be 
divided .unless the parties agree otherwise." "For overnight 
visitation more than 100 days, but not exactly 50/50 pint 
custody (i.e 182 1/2 days) use ..formula:" 
Idaho* "An adjustment for shared physical custody may be 
made when each parent has the child more than 35% of the 
year " "An adjustment assumes a true shanng, not just 
extended visitation to take advantage of the thirty-five 
percent threshold " " .may reduce the amount of support if 
a parent has the child for thirty consecutive days or more A 
reasonable reduction would be 50% for the duration of the 
actual physical custodyM 
Indiana " ..an infinite number of situations that may prompt a 
judge to deviate from the Guideline amount....examples. 
The children spend substantially more time with the 
noncustodial parent than in the average case The custodial 
parent has moved a substantial distance away and the 
noncustodial parent will incur significant travel expemses in 
visiting with the child" 
Kansas "Any substantial and reasonable long-distance 
transportation/communication costs directly associated with 
visitation shall be considered by the Court The Court may 
consider giving credit for the time spent with the 
noncustodial parent, and when the time spent with the 
noncustodial parent exceeds thirty (30%) of the child's time 
or when the noncustodial parent has the child for a single 
block of time (including custodial parent's visitation) in excess 
of thirty days, the Court shall consider the increased costs to 
the noncustodial parent and the savings of the custodial 
parent and may adjust the child support accordingly" 
" giving consideration to the....increased cost to the 
noncustodial parent attributable to the child's visit Any 
reduction shall not leave the custodial parent with less than 
33% of the Combined Total Child Support Obligation" 
Louisiana "In cases of joint custody, the court may consider 
the penod of time spent by a child with the nondomiciliary 
party as a basis for adjustment to the amount of child support 
to be paid dunng that penod of time " 
Maine " justify deviation from the support guidelines.. The 
nonprimary residential care provider is in fact providing 
pnmary residential care for more than 30% of the time on an 
annual basts N 
Maryland "Shared pnysical custody means that each parent 
keeps the child or children overnight for more than 35% of 
the year and that both parents contnbute to the expenses of 
the child or children in addition to the payment of child 
support" "Each parent's share of the adjusted basic child 
support obligation shall then be multiplied by the percentage 
of time the child or children spend with the other parent tc 
determine the theoretical basic child support obligation owec 
to the other parent" M in addition if either parent incurs 
child care expenses the expense shall be divided betweer 
the parents in proportion to their respective adjusted actua 
incomes " 
Massachusetts "Where the parties agree to shared physical 
custody or the court determines that shared physical custody 
is in the best interests of the children, these guidelines are 
not applicable" 
Minnesota "When children share substantial amounts ol 
time with each parent, whether or not there is a pint physical 
custody order, child suppport should be calculated by 
offsetting the parties' support obligations Substantial shared 
time with children translates into economic shanng beginning 
when the parent with the lesser amount of time with the 
children has the children in his/her care for a minimum of 128 
overnights annually" "It is recommneded that every child 
support order address the issue of visitation abatement" 
Mississippi . .the guidelines would be unjust or 
inappropnate in a particular case...cntena The particular 
shared parental arrangement, such as where the 
noncustodial parent spends a great deal of time with the 
children thereby reducing the financial expenditures 
incurred by the custodial parent. " 
Montana: "When the obligor parents share joint physical 
custody (both parents have custody of the children more 
than 30% of a 365 day penod), to avoid unnecessary transfer 
of funds, the "pay over of each parent for the year should be 
determined.." 
Nebraska "Visitation adjustments or direct cost shanng 
should be specified in the support order Dunng visitation 
penods of 4 or more weeks, support payments may ordinanly 
be reduced by 50% When a specific provision for joint 
physaal custody is ordered, support may be calculated ." 
Nevada "...court shall consider the following factors when 
adjusting the amount of support....The cost of transportation 
of the child to and from visitation if the custodial parent 
moved with the child from the junsdiction... The amount of 
time the child spends with each parent" 
New Hampshire "Special circumstances., may result in 
adjustments ..split or shared custody arrangements," 
New Jersey These child support guidelines are intended 
to be applied to cases having traditional custody and 
visitation arrangements" 
The Joint Custody Association, Page 
New Mexico: "Shared responsibility means a custody 
arrangement whereby each parent provides a suitable home 
for the children of the parties, when the children spend at 
least thirty percent of the year in each home and the parents 
significantly share the duties, responsibilities and expenses 
or parenting; " "Equal responsibility means a custody 
arrangement identical to shared responsibility situations, 
except that the children of the parties spend a minimum of 
forty-five percent of the year in "each home." "In shared 
responsibilirty situations, the parent with more responsibility 
retains seventy-five percent of the direct expenses and the 
parent with less responsibility retains twenty-five percent of 
his share..." "In equal responsibility situations, each parent 
retains one-half of his share of the basic child support 
obligation for direct expenses." 
Ohio: "For cases with split custody, third party custody, or 
extensive sharing of physical custody, each parent's 
calculated share of child support becomes the basis for 
determining his or her legal child support obligation." 
Oklahoma: "If the court adopts a joint custody plan...the 
court shall have the authority...to accept a plan which 
allocates the payment of actual expenses of the children 
rather than designating one custodial parent the "payor" and 
one the "payee"..." 
Oregon: "Determine whether the shared custody rule...or 
the split custody rule..apply. If they do, then apply them and 
adjust each parent's child support obligation pursuant to the 
applicable rule." "When by agreement..or by court order, the 
child or children are expected to be in the physical custody of 
the noncustodial parent more than 35% of all overnights, the 
child support to be paid to the non custodial parent may be 
reduced to recongize costts incured by the noncustodial 
parent.." "Hearings officer or the court may reduce the 
support amount to be paid by the noncustodial parent by a 
percentage equal to twice the prercentage by which all 
overnights with the noncustodial parent exceed 35 percent." 
Pennsylvania: "Divided or split custody. Where one or more 
children reside with each party, the guidelines for "spouse 
and children" will be used instead of the guidelines for 
children only,..." "...a non-custodial parent's support 
obligation should be reduced only if that parent spends an 
unusual amount of time with the children." 
Rhode island: "Since the guidelines do not specifically 
address or consider cases involving split custody, third party 
custody or extensive sharing of physical custody, the court, 
in exercise of its broad discretion, may find it necessary to 
deviate from the guidelines." 
South Carolina: "After a review of various child support 
models that deal with joint custody arrangements, the Child 
Support Guidelines Subcommittee decided that an equitable 
and adequate amount of child support could not be awarded 
by using a guidelines formula in those cases involving joint 
custody." 
South Dakota: "Deviations may be made from the 
schedule...any of...factors: The effect of custody and 
visitation provisions including whether children share 
substantial amounts of time with each parent." 
Tennessee: "If the child(ren) is/are not staying overnight 
with the obligor for the average visitation period of every 
other weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening, two 
weeks during the summer and two weeks during holiday 
pr^ nods throughout the year, then an amount shall be added 
to the percentage calculated in the above rule to 
compensate the obligee for the cost of providing care tor the 
child(ren) for the amount of time during the average visitation 
period that the chiid(ren) are not with the obligor." There are 
cases where guidelines are neither appropriate nor 
equitable. Guidelines are inappropriate...in cases where 
physical custody of the children) is more equitably divided 
between the parties..." 
Utah: "Joint physical custody means the child stays with 
each parent overnight tor more than 25% of the year, and 
both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in 
addition to paying child support. The total child support shall 
be determined as follows:" Nine factors, or calculations, are 
listed. 
Vermont: "Shared custody guidelines. The materials in this 
section were developed outside the Agency of Human 
Services as one possible approach to establishing support 
where custody of a child is shared by both parents. These 
materials may be useful in a partricuiar case, but are certainly 
not required to be used." 
Virginia: "...factors affecting the obligation and the ability of 
each party to provide child support: Arrangements regarding 
custody of the children." 
Washington: "Basic child support shall be allocated between 
the parents when a child stays overnight with the parent over 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the year. When this adjustment 
is sought, and the parents are not in agreement, the parent 
seeking the adjustment shall provide evidence to 
demonstrate the parents' actual past involvement with the 
child." "Residential schedule credit: For father's residential 
schedule credit enter the amount listed on Worksheet B, line 
26." 
West Virginia: "Where parents share physical joint custody 
on an equal basis, each shall be considered to have the child 
for six months during the course of year. To avoid 
unnecessary transfers of funds, the "pay out" of each parent 
for the year should be determined..." 
Wisconsin: "Shared time payer means a payer who is not the 
primary custodian but who provides overnight child care 
beyond the threshold and assumes all variable child care 
costs in proportion to the number of days he or she cares for 
the child under the shared-time arrangement." 
The Joint Custody Association, Page 4 
Exhibit "G" 
Section 5. The Operation of the Guideline 
A Preliminary View | 
5.3. Number of children per family 
Data was collected concerning the number of children subject to each 
order. This data is summarized in the following table. 
1 Table 5-2 1 
j Number of Child Subject to Each Order | 
#o f 
Children 
1 child 
2 children 
1 3 children 
# of 
Orders 
229 
152 
56 
%age of 
Total 
Orders 
51.0 
33.9 
12.5 
# of 
Children 
4 children 
5 or more 
children 
' 
# of 
Orders 
6 
6 
%age of 
Total 
Orders 
1.3 
1.3 
As can be seen from this data, the great majority of cases involve fewer 
than four children. This data lends further support for the 
recommendation in section 9.11 that the Legislature might want to study 
the increases in guideline orders for cases of more than three children 
and consider the use of discretion in cases involving large numbers of 
ehudren
- rp-jLUf^-
5.4. Range of visitation 
One of the significant factors affecting the amount of child support 
ordered in a particular case is the amount of time the child spends with 
each parent.215 The guideline orders surveyed showed a range of 
visitation as shown in the following table. 
See Table 5-J 
As can been seen from this data, the commonly held view that average 
visitation in cases where there is non-zero visitation, gathers around the 
20 percent range is true, at least as to this data sampling. While cases 
that fall outside this normal range should be entitled to the full 
215
 See discussion in section 3.2. 
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ection5. The Operation of the Guideline 
A Preliminary View 
| Table 5-3 1 
1 Range of Visitation J 
Amount of time children spend 
with "non-custodial" parent 
Less than 5 percent 
5 to 10 percent 
11 to 15 percent 
16 to 20 percent 
21 to 25 percent 
26 to 30 percent 
31 to 35 percent 
36 to 40 percent 
1 41 to 45 percent 
1 More than 45 percent 
Number of Cases 
137 
35 
18 
162 
20 
20 
11 
10 
5 
8 
Percentage of 
Cases 
32 
8 
4 
3 8 
5 
5 
3 
2 
1 
_2 J 
adjustment, up or down, for the amount of visitation involved, it might 
reduce the amount of litigation involved if the guideline provided a 
"default" level of visitation of 20 percent which would apply in cases in 
which the amount of visitation was not lower than 15 percent nor higher 
than 25 percent. Given the reduced effect of the visitation adjustment 
under the current guideline, this change may be desirable.216 
5.5 Disparity of income 
The effect of the amount of visitation on the ultimate child support 
guideline order varies, depending on the disparity between the income of 
the two parents. If the parents have roughly equal income, the effect is 
greater than if one parent has a significantly higher income than the 
other. 
216 s e e discussion of this recommendation in section 9.9. 
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9.8. Simplified income and expense declaration 
The primary factual document used by the court in determining child 
support is the income and expense declaration of each party.284 The 
information sought by this form is comprehensive and it is designed to be 
used in a variety of situations involving a marriage dissolution or child 
support. As a consequence the form may be unnecessarily complex for 
the "average" child support hearing. The advisory committee plans to 
study whether a simplified income and expense declaration would be 
helpful to the many litigants appearing in child support matters without 
an attorney. Depending on the results of this study, a simplified form or 
other instructional material may be developed. 
9.9. "Default" visitation amount 
As shown in section 5.4, the great majority of child support cases involve 
visitation orders ranging between 15 and 25 percent. The child support 
formula requires a specific amount of visitation to be used in each case. 
If the amount of visitation were considered to be 20 percent in all cases 
except where the actual amount exceeded 25 percent, or was below 15 
percent, a set of tables could be developed to aid in the calculation of 
child support. This "presumption" could also lessen disputes between 
parents over relatively small amounts of visitation, either as part of the 
child support proceeding or the child custody proceeding.285 
9.10. Earning capacity alternative 
California's guideline contains a simple provision permitting the court to 
consider earning capacity in lieu of a parent's income.286 Many states 
have provisions specifying factors for the court to consider in 
determining whether to use earning capacity instead of income. It would 
be helpful if the factors used in other states, as well as the case law 
provisions developed in California, were studied and the guideline revised 
2 8 4
 See discussion of this form and its attachments in sectons 4.2.9 
through 4.2.12. 
2 8 5
 One result of the formula established by Senate Bill No. 370 was to 
lessen the effect on the guideline of a relatively small change in the 
amount of visiation. 
2 8 6
 Family Code section 4058(b). 
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Exhibi t "H" 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
123 East Main 
P.O. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
Telephone (801) 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRADLEY J. UDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA RUDD UDY, 
Defendant• 
OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JOINT CUSTODY SUPPORT WORKSHEET 
Civil No. 92400268DA 
ILSON & HOGGAN. P C 
ATTORNEYS AT CAW 
6 6 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 5 2 5 
LOGAN UTAH 6 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5 
(SOD 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
TREMONTON OFFICE 
123 CAST MAIN 
P O BOX 115 
TREMONTON. UTAH 6 4 3 3 7 
(B01)257-3 
Plaintiff/Husband filed for a Rule 60 and Rule 59 Motion to 
Change the Child Support from a sole custody worksheet to a joint 
custody worksheet. 
Defendant/Wife objects to this Motion for these reasons: 
1. Plaintiff/Husband does not state under what theory the 
Court should change the support (i.e. clerical error, accident or 
surprise, newly discovered evidence, error in law, mistake, 
excusable neglect, fraud, etc.) . Defendant /Wife cannot imagine any 
subsection of Rule 60 or 59 that Plaintiff/Husband could 
justifiably make their argument. Their argument is in fact a 
request to have the Judge merely reconsider and make their old 
argument. 
2. Plaintiff/Husband in fact advanced the theory that the 
Court should use a joint custody worksheet (see Plaintiff's Status 
Report, page 3, item 3, dated June l, 1993); (Plaintiff's Complaint 
asking for joint custody); (Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause 
OLSON & HOGGAN P C 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
6 8 WEST CENTER 
P O SOX 5 2 5 
LOGAN UTAH 843230525 
(SO I > 752 1551 
T R E M O N T O N OFFICE 
123 EAST MAIN 
P O BOX 115 
TREMONTON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
( 8 0 1 ) 2 5 7 3 
requesting joint custody support calculations). Plaintiff/Husband 
has had his day in court and his chance to prove up why joint 
custody child support should be ordered. This matter is res 
judicata. There needs to be an end to a court order. 
3. Defendant/Wife was in fact awarded sole custody in the 
Order to Show Cause hearing held on October 8, 1992 and February 
11, 1993. Defendant/Wife was also awarded sole custody in the 
divorce on September 1, 1993. The Court had every right to follow 
the sole custody child support schedule in those instances and 
rightly did so. 
4. Only in cases of "joint physical custody" is a joint 
physical custody support worksheet used. The court awarded sole 
physical custody to Defendant/Wife and the standard statutory 
visitation guidelines, but with some expanded visitation. 
5. "Joint physical custody" is defined as "the child stays 
with each parent over night for more than twenty-five percent (25%) 
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the 
child in addition to paying child support". U.C.A. §78-45-2(7) 
Plaintiff/Husband had his chance to prove he is paying the expenses 
of the child in addition to just paying child support and the Court 
did not make any finding that Plaintiff/Husband paid extra support. 
The Court basically found that Defendant/Wife was paying for the 
child's expenses and ordered Plaintiff/Husband to pay sole custody 
child support. This was totally in line with the support 
guidelines. Plaintiff/Husband cannot re-argue his case just 
because he failed to prove that he was contributing to the child's 
expenses. The truth is Defendant/Wife pays all costs for clothing, 
housing, and other basic needs for the child. Plaintiff/Husband 
spends for the child's needs just like every other father who has 
visitation. 
6. Defendant/Wife was not granted any alimony and she can 
barely support herself and the child on $273.00 per month in child 
support. Defendant/Wife spends in fact more than $273.00 per month 
3 
on the child. It would be an abuse of justice to reduce the 
support even more. 
7. Plaintiff/Husband has not filed an Affidavit to support 
his motion, therefore, Rule 59(c) would restrict 
Plaintiff/Husband's Motion to Rule 59(a) 5, 6 or 7. The only 
possible item Plaintiff/Husband could advance would be an error at 
law since the damages are not excessive and the evidence was 
clearly present when the Court made the decision so it was not 
insufficient. The Court has the discretion, in awarding support, 
to take factors into account such as primary residence, alimony, 
child's needs, ability to pay for extra items (see U.C.A. §30-3-5; 
§78-45-7). If the guidelines are rebutted, the Court can look at 
all the factors in §78-45-7(3). The Court certainly considered 
these factors as well as other equities in awarding child support 
as it did. The award cannot therefore be challenged merely on an 
error in application of the law. 
8. Rule 60(b) requires a showing of grounds, time lines, 
plus the fact the Plaintiff/Husband would succeed on the merits of 
his case. Plaintiff/Husband had a chance to argue his merits 
already and did not succeed. His Motion is really just a request 
for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules. Drurv v. 
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Wife requests the Court to deny Plaintiff/Husband 's 
Motion on the grounds it is not specific, fails to state proper 
grounds for the Motion, is unsupported by affidavit; is just a 
request for reconsideration and not proper under the rules, is 
unsupported by the facts and the Court has already decided upon 
Plaintiff/Husband's requests for joint support, denied the same and 
it is res judicata. Plaintiff/Husband's proper remedy is an appeal 
if he is not satisfied with the Court's first ruling. 
Defendant/Wife requests her attorney fees to defend against 
this Motion in the sum of $300.00. 
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DATED this / 2- day of October, 1993. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
A**JL 
Marlin J. Grant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Joint Custody Support 
Worksheet to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff Thorne of MANN, HADFIELD & 
THORNE, at 98 North Main, P. 0. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302, 
this /Z- day of October, 1993. 
Marl in J. Grai^ tf 
udy.obj/m}g/div 
OLSON & HOGGAN. P C 
ATTORNEY* AT LAW 
6 6 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 5 2 3 
LOGAN UTAH 64323-032S 
(801)752 1591 
TREMONTON OFFICE 
123 EAST MAIN 
PO »OX 115 
TREMONTON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
(601)257 2 
